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Notes & Comments
Joint Tortfeasors, Full Compensation,
and the 1,800 Degree Crucible:
Rekindling Rhode Island's Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
in the Aftermath of the Station
Nightclub Fire
It was an old wooden dance hall
In a blue collar town
And an old rock and roll band
They burned the place down.'
The Station Nightclub fire marked the worst disaster in
Rhode Island's history since the hurricane of 1938.2 Recognized as
the fourth deadliest fire in the nation's history, the February 20,
2003 inferno killed one hundred people, and injured over two
hundred. 3 In response to this horrific tragedy, Rhode Island
lawmakers scrambled to resolve a host of serious problems
exposed by the blaze's terrible wake. The forefront of the state's
concerns
included embarrassingly
antiquated fire safety
regulations, 4 a shamefully ineffective workers' compensation
1. Audio recording: White Flash, by Garrison Keillor, performed live at
the Bayfront Park Amphitheater in Miami, Florida (Mar. 1, 2003) available
at http://prairiehome.publicradio.org/programs/20030301/flash.shtml.
2. Jennifer Levitz, Tracy Breton & Paul Edward Parker, First Lawsuits
Filed in Fire, PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 5, 2003, at 1.

3.

Franci Richardson, Station Blaze a Sad Anniversary: 100 Lost in Fire,

BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 15, 2004, at 16.

4.

Edward Fitzpatrick & Peter B. Lord, The State is Not Going to Like
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compliance system, 5 and "an almost unbearable financial burden
'6
on state and local emergency responders and governments.
Appropriately, the legislature ranked the massive financial
costs imposed on the Station Fire victims and their families high
on their agenda. One analyst has valued the potential liability at
stake as approaching one billion dollars. 7
To facilitate the
settlement of the Station Fire civil actions, in June 2006, the
Rhode Island General Assembly passed legislation amending
Rhode Island's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
("RIUCATA"). 8
Named the "Station Fire Bill," the law was
modeled after legislation taking affect shortly after the Rhode
Island banking crisis of 1991.9 Like the 1991 legislation, the 2006
amendments to RIUCATA were designed to encourage out-ofcourt settlements by denying non-settling joint tortfeasors the
right to seek contribution from tortfeasors who settle with the
plaintiff prior to trial. 10 The settlement thereby "reduces the
claim against the other tortfeasors in the amount of the
consideration paid for the release."11
The recent legislation,
however, is limited only to catastrophic disasters resulting in
12
twenty-five or more deaths.
The 2006 amendments to RIUCATA have had a momentous
effect on settlement releases brokered in mass tort claims
involving multiple defendants. Yet, given the General Assembly's
recent treatment of RIUCATA, coupled with concerns raised by
the Rhode Island Supreme Court regarding the statute's wisdom,
one is left wondering why Rhode Island continues to adhere to its

What it Sees, PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 2, 2003, at 1.
5. Lynn Arditi, Workers' Comp Scofflaws Now Paying the Price,
PROVIDENCE J., May 19, 2003, at 1.
6. Mark Arsenault, White House Rejects Appeal for DisasterDeclaration,
PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 24, 2003, at 1.
7. Neil Downing, Who Will Pay for this Huge Loss?, PROVIDENCE J., Feb.
25, 2003, at B14.
8. R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 10-6-1 to 10-6-11 (1997) (amended 2006); see also
Tracy Breton, Station Fire Settlement Bill Becomes Law, PROVIDENCE J., Jun.
30, 2006, at 1.
9. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-6-1 to 10-6-11. See also id. at § 42-116-40
(2006).
10. See, e.g., id. at § 10-6-8 (1997); H.R. 7109, 120th Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (R.I. 2006). See also R.I. GEN. LAWs § 42-116-40 (2006 Reenactment).
11. R.I. GEN. LAws § 10-6-7 (1997).
12. Id. See also id. at § 10-6-8.
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traditional contribution scheme for joint tortfeasor claims that do
not rise to the magnitude of loss specified by 2006 law. The
Station Fire Bill eliminates the settlement disincentives
Accordingly, it is this author's
effectuated by RIUCATA.
contention that the bill's application should be extended to all
litigants, and not merely those involved in mass disasters causing
at least twenty-five deaths. Through adoption of a contribution
regime friendlier to the facilitation of out-of-court settlements,
several favorable policy goals are likely to be achieved: finality of
litigation for settling defendants, conservation of judicial
resources, and full compensation for those injured by the wrongful
acts of others.
In support of this perspective, Part I of this Comment
describes the statutory framework of RIUCATA, and provides an
overview of the Act's most prominent features, as well as how
these provisions have been construed and applied by Rhode
Island's courts. Part II explores the existing dichotomy between
the Act's purpose of creating a statutory right of contribution, and
Rhode Island's public policy of promoting out-of-court settlements.
Part III briefly discusses legislation passed by the General
Assembly in 1991 in response to the state banking crisis - laws
which later inspired lawmakers to pass the Station Fire Bill. Part
IV concludes with a discussion of the Station Fire disaster, the
Station Fire Bill, and how the bill's passage represents a move in
the right direction towards a fairer, more sensible, contribution
system for joint tortfeasors and plaintiffs alike.
I. THE RHODE ISLAND UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS

ACT

A. The Basics
In Rhode Island, tort claims involving multiple defendants are
governed by RIUCATA, which addresses matters concerning
contribution among joint tortfeasors and settlement releases. 13
Rhode Island also adheres to the common law maxim of joint and

13. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-6-1 to 10-6-11 (1997). See also RONALD J.
RESMINI, RHODE ISLAND TORT LAW AND PERSONAL INJURY PRACTICE, § 681 (2d
ed. 1999).
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several liability.14
Pursuant to the doctrine, a plaintiff who
suffers an indivisible injury by the acts or omissions of two or
more defendants may recover 100% of her damages from any one
defendant individually, irrespective of the particular defendant's
degree of culpability. 15 In other words, a plaintiff is entitled to
recover her full damage award from any one defendant, even if the
defendant's assigned liability is negligible.
Contribution is an equitable remedy available to a joint
tortfeasor who has paid more than his "fair share" of damages
under the joint and several liability scheme. Historically, Rhode
Island common law mandated the application of joint and several
liability, but did not recognize the right of contribution among
joint tortfeasors. 16 This meant that a joint tortfeasor, having paid
100% of the plaintiffs damage award, could not seek monetary
contribution from his co-tortfeasors. One rationale advanced for
denying contribution among joint tortfeasors was that "courts
should not lend their aid to rascals in adjusting the differences
17
among them."
In response to this perceived inequity, within the first half of
the twentieth century the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act of 1939 ("Uniform Act").' 8 Primarily, the model
statute was intended "to abandon the common-law rule denying
the right of contribution among tortfeasors."' 9 Rhode Island
adopted the model act, RIUCATA, without substantial

modification, in 1940.20
Like the Uniform Act, RIUCATA establishes the right of
contribution among joint tortfeasors. 2 1 A joint tortfeasor's right to

14. See Roberts-Robertson v. Lombardi, 598 A.2d 1380, 1381 (R.I. 1991).
15. See id.
16. See Hackett v. Hyson, 48 A.2d 353, 354 (R.I. 1946). See also R. D.
Hursh, Annotation, ContributionBetween Negligent Tortfeasors at Common
Law, 60 A.L.R.2d. 1366, 1368 (1958).
17. Hawkins v. Gadoury, 713 A.2d 799, 802 (R.I. 1999) (citations
omitted).
18. See UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, §§ 1 to 12
(amended 1955), 12 U.L.A. 185 (1939).
19. W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Uniform ContributionAmong Tortfeasors
Act, 34 A.L.R.2d 1107, 1108 (1954).
20. 1940 R.I. Pub. Laws 1222.
21.

R.I. GEN. LAws § 10-6-3 (1997).
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contribution vests once he discharges the other tortfeasor's
liability, either by settlement with the plaintiff, or by satisfaction
of a judgment entered against him. 22 If, by satisfying the common
liability, the paying joint tortfeasor remits more than his equitable
share of damages, he can recover the difference from the other
23
tortfeasors.
RIUCATA also contemplates the mechanics of pre-trial
settlements involving joint tortfeasors by allowing a plaintiff to
recover his full damage award from a non-settling joint
tortfeasor. 24 Thus, if a plaintiff settles with one joint tortfeasor,
his right to sue the second joint tortfeasor is not extinguished by
25
the settlement unless the settlement release states otherwise.
Any award entered against the non-settling tortfeasor, however,
will be reduced by either the amount of the settlement received,
or, the amount or proportion stipulated in the settlement,
whichever is greater.26 This offset is intended to prevent a
plaintiff from receiving a "double recovery," and is generally
27
referred to as the "pro rata" or "proportionate share" rule.
Finally, a settlement release does not relieve the settling
tortfeasor "from liability to make contribution to another joint
tortfeasor unless the release is given before the right of the other
tortfeasor to secure a money judgment for contribution has
accrued, and provides for a reduction, to the extent of the pro rata
share of the released tortfeasor, of the injured person's damages
recoverable against all the other tortfeasors. ''28 In other words, a
joint tortfeasor's settlement with the plaintiff does not shield him
from the possibility of later being sued for contribution by a nonsettling defendant. Likewise, a joint tortfeasor does not forfeit his
right to contribution by entering into a settlement release that
22. Id. at § 10-6-4.
23. Id.
24. Id. at § 10-6-6.
25. Id. at § 10-6-7.

26. Id.
27. Augustine v. Langlais, 402 A.2d 1187, 1189 (R.I. 1979) (The Rhode

Island Supreme Court commented that Section 10-6-7 of RIUCATA is a
"verbatim enactment" of Section Four of the Uniform Act; the model statute
"predicated upon the fundamental doctrine that an injured person is entitled
to only of satisfaction of the tort, even though two or more parties contributed
to the loss.").

See also J.D. LEE & BARRY LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW,

LIABILITY, AND LITIGATION, §

28.

20:29 (2d ed. 2002).

R.I. GEN. LAws § 10-6-8 (1997).
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discharges all of the defendants. 29
As previously noted, Rhode Island's contribution statute is
modeled after the 1939 version of the Uniform Act. Subsequently,
in 1955, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws revisited the Uniform Act, making several significant
changes to Section Four, the model act's provisions governing
settlement releases. 30 First, the Commissioners inserted a "good
faith" requirement in the provision's preamble, indicating that the
revised modifications of Section Four would apply only to those
settlement releases executed in good faith. 31 Next, the Uniform
Act's authors rejected the pro rata, or "proportionate share"
reduction rule mandated by the 1939 version, noting that it was
"one of the chief causes of complaint where the Act has been
adopted. '32 The Commissioners substituted instead a "pro tanto"
or "dollar for dollar" offset calculation. 33 Thus, under the 1955
revised Uniform Act, a plaintiffs judgment against a non-settling
joint tortfeasor is simply reduced by the actual amount received
from earlier-negotiated settlements. Lastly, the Commissioners
explicitly stated in the 1955 revision that a settlement executed in
good faith "discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all
liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor."34
In transforming the Uniform Act's partial-settlement
provision, the Commissioners relied on two important
observations. First, the Uniform Act's authors commented that

29. Id. at § 10-6-5.
30.

See UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, § 4 cmt. (amended

1955), 12 U.L.A. 264 (1939). Section Four of the 1955 revision of the model
act states:
When a release or covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is
given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the
same injury or wrongful death: (a) It does not discharge any of the
other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death
unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the claim against the
others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the
covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever
is greater; and, (b) it discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given
from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor.

Id. at § 4.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
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including a good faith precondition on all settlement releases
involving joint tortfeasors would enable courts to take a hard look
at settlement releases as way of addressing problems involving
collusion, or, "Mary Carter 35 agreements between the plaintiff
and the settling defendant. 36 Second, the authors pointedly
emphasized that the pro rata reduction rule's effect "ha[d] been to
discourage settlements in joint tort cases, by making it impossible
for one tortfeasor alone to take a release and close the file. 3 7
Plaintiffs' attorneys, in particular, severely criticized the 1939
Uniform Act as a barrier to settlement negotiations "because they
[had] no way of knowing what they're giving up. 38 At least under
the vision of the 1955 revised Uniform Act, a plaintiff who settles
with less than all of the defendants can proceed in the ongoing
litigation knowing that any subsequent judgments rendered in his
favor will be reduced by a definitive sum, rather than a fuzzy
projection representing the settling defendant's degree of
culpability. Defendants also complained that the pro rata rule
discouraged them from entertaining settlement negotiations,
because, as the authors wisely noted, "[n]o defendant wants to
settle when he remains open to contribution in an uncertain
amount, to be determined on the basis of a judgment against
35. See RESMINI, supra note 13, at § 704 ("A 'Mary Carter' agreement is a
settlement device used in multi-party litigation. Under the typical Mary

Carter agreement, the plaintiff releases his or her cause of action against a
joint tortfeasor in return for his or her participation in the trial against
another tortfeasor. The plaintiff also promises to pay the settling tortfeasor a
portion of the recovery received from the nonsettling tortfeasor. Although the
Rhode Island Supreme Court has never considered the validity of the Mary
Carter agreement, a number of courts void the agreement on the grounds
that it violates public policy intent of both the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act and the canon of legal ethics.").
36. See UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, § 4 cmt. (amended
1955), 12 U.L.A. 265 (1939). The Uniform Act's authors commented that:
[t]he idea underlying the 1939 provision was that the plaintiff should
not be permitted to release one tortfeasor from his fair share of
liability and mulct another instead, from motives of sympathy or
spite, because it might be easier to collect from than from the other;
and that the release from contribution affords too much opportunity
for collusion between the plaintiff and the released tortfeasor against
the one not released ...
[i]f the plaintiff wishes to discriminate as to
defendants, the 1939 provision does not prevent him from doing so.

Id.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
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another in a suit to which he will not be a party. '39
Unfortunately, despite the convincing reasons articulated by the
Uniform Commission in adopting the pro tanto reduction rule,
Rhode Island, for the most part, has not followed suit.
B. Who is a Joint Tortfeasor?
Exactly who qualifies as a joint-tortfeasor under RIUCATA is
generally a fact-intensive inquiry of which the Rhode Island
Supreme Court has had several opportunities to consider.
RIUCATA defines "joint tortfeasors" as "two or more persons
'40
jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person.
Rhode Island case law has further clarified this proposition and
delineated the scope of the definition's reach.
In Wilson v. Krasnoff, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
established a two-prong analysis for determining whether a
defendant is in fact a joint tortfeasor within the meaning of Rhode
Island's contribution act:
First, the parties must be "liable in tort." The phrase
"liable in tort" has been construed to mean to have
negligently contributed to another's injury. Second, the
statute refers to the same injury. The same injury is
caused by parties who engage in common wrongs. To
constitute joint tortfeasors under the act, both parties
1
must have engaged in common wrongs. 4
Noting that prior federal court decisions interpreting
RIUCATA did not look past the initial inquiry in determining
whether two parties were joint tortfeasors (i.e., whether the
defendant contributed to the plaintiffs injury),42 the Wilson
court's motivation for imposing the second part of the analysis
regarding "common wrongs" was likely influenced by the
particular facts presented in the case. The plaintiff injured
herself after sustaining a fall down a flight of stairs, which were

39.
40.
41.

Id.

42.

Id. (citing Day v. J. Brendan Wynn, D.O., Inc., 702 F.2d 10, 12 (1st

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-6-2 (1970).
560 A.2d 335, 339 (R.I. 1989).

Cir. 1983); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Holmes, 435 F.2d 1232, 1234 (1st Cir.
1970)).
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allegedly in a state of disrepair. 4 3 Following the accident, two
doctors at Newport Hospital provided the plaintiff with medical
care, one of whom recommended that the plaintiff undergo back
surgery. 44 The plaintiff later denied receiving any consultation
regarding the prospective risks and benefits of back surgery, and
allegedly only learned of the surgery about an hour before the
45
operation was scheduled to begin.
Five months following her initial admission, the plaintiff reinjured her back and returned to Newport Hospital, again
receiving care from one of the doctors she had treated with
following her fall. 46 She also subsequently sought treatment from
a chronic back pain specialist, who eventually performed a second
back surgery. 47 The results were far from satisfactory, leaving the
plaintiff confined to a wheelchair.4 8 The plaintiff sued the owner
of the building where the initial injury occurred, and the three
doctors involved in the surgical treatment of her back.
Prior to trial, the plaintiff settled her claims against the four
defendants for a lump sum, which was paid by the building
owner's insurance carrier. 49 Apparently assuming that he had
discharged the common liability, the building owner sought
contribution against the three doctors. 50 During the contribution
action, the doctors disputed their joint tortfeasor status, and
moved for a directed verdict. 5 1 The Rhode Island Supreme Court
affirmed the superior court's issuance of the motion, agreeing that
the building owner had "failed to establish a prima facie case [for]
52
contribution."
Determining that the plaintiff alleged four distinct injuries
over a period of one year, the court held that the building owner
and three doctors were not joint tortfeasors as contemplated by
RIUCATA because their conduct had not contributed to the "same

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See id. at 337.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 338.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-6-4 (1997).
See Wilson, 560 A.2d. at 338.
Id.
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injury."53 Emphasizing the nature and timing of the plaintiffs
injuries - the fall down the stairs, the first surgery at Newport
Hospital, the second injury requiring readmission, and the last
surgery by the chronic back pain specialist - the court concluded
that since neither the building owner nor the doctors had the
opportunity to guard against each other's negligence, they had not
'54
engaged in "common wrongs.
Hence, the court must consider two factors in determining
whether two or more defendants contributed to a "common
wrong," thereby exposing the defendants to joint tortfeasor
liability. Specifically, the court must determine "the time at
which each party failed to act and whether a party had the ability
to guard against the negligence of another. '55 Since the building
owner's alleged misconduct occurred well before plaintiffs
surgeries, and, unlike the doctors, he alone had possession and
control of the stairs upon which she was injured, the doctors could
not guard against his tortious conduct. 5 6 Along the same line of
reasoning, the building owner could not prevent the alleged
malpractice of the doctors following the plaintiffs admission to the
57
hospital.
Additionally, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has extended
joint tortfeasor status to reach defendants who otherwise enjoy
statutory or common law immunity against civil liability. In one of
the earliest published opinions discussing RIUCATA, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court, in Zarrella v. Miller, held that a plaintiffs
husband, although immune from direct suit by the plaintiff herself
by operation by the doctrine of interspousal immunity,
58
nonetheless qualified as a joint tortfeasor subject to contribution.
The plaintiff, a passenger in an automobile operated by her
husband, was injured when their car collided with a vehicle driven
by the defendant. 59 The plaintiff sued the defendant, and the
parties settled the matter. 60 Later, the settling defendant sued
53. Id. at 339-40. The court relied heavily upon Pennsylvania case law,
particularly Lasprogatav. Qualls, 397 A.2d 803 (Pa. 1979).
54. Id. at 340.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 217 A.2d 673, 675 (R.I. 1966).
59. Id. at 674.
60. Id.
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the plaintiffs husband for contribution, asserting that the
husband was a joint tortfeasor. 6 1 The husband protested the
contribution action, contending that his interspousal immunity
insulated him not only from a negligence suit initiated by his wife,
but from contribution suits brought against him under RIUCATA
62
as well.

Concluding the term "liable in tort," as expressed in the
Uniform Act referred to a defendant's culpability and not the
plaintiffs own ability to enforce liability, the court reasoned that
the statute "was enacted in this state.., as a modern mechanism

for a fairer administration of justice. ' '6 3 Quoting, with approval,
the wisdom of Dean Prosser, the court further acknowledged that
"[t]here is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits
the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally,
unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone ...
''64
while the latter goes scot free.
Finally, judicial concern for permitting an otherwise liable
defendant to go "scot free" was also apparent in Laird v. Chrysler
Corp.6 5 In Laird, the court determined that the Rhode Island
legislature's abolition of sovereign immunity in 1969 "manifest[ed]
the state's consent to liability as a joint tortfeasor and for
contribution." 66 Contribution suits against the state and its
thirty-nine municipalities, however, would be limited to the
statutory cap on damages recoverable from the state or its
67
political subdivisions.

C. What Does Pro Rata Mean?
Because Rhode Island has continued to cling to the pro rata
reduction rule, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has experienced
some difficulty determining exactly what the concept means,
61. Id.
62. Id. at 675. The court held that "[i]n this state a wife may not
maintain a suit against her husband for injuries caused by the latter's
negligence." Id. (citations omitted).
63. Id. at 676 (citing Hackett v. Hyson, 48 A.2d 353 (R.I. 1946)).
64. Id. (citations omitted).
65. 460 A.2d 425 (R.I. 1983).
66. See id. at 430; see also R.I. GEN. LAwS § 9-3-1 (1969).
67. Laird, A.2d at 430. When Laird was decided, the maximum award
recoverable in a tort action against the state was $50,000. That amount has
since been increased to $100,000. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-31-2 (1984).
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especially in light of modern developments in tort law. Although
the statute clearly preconditions the right to contribution upon a
'
defendant's payment of money exceeding his "pro rata share,"68
the original 1940 version of RIUCATA was silent with respect to
the precise proportion of damages that constitutes one's "pro rata
share."
Initially, Rhode Island courts construed the term to mean
"equal division."
For example, assuming two defendants are
jointly liable for the same injury, a joint tortfeasor who paid off
the entire common liability was entitled to contribution
The
representing one-half of the plaintiffs damage award.
authors of the 1955 revision of the Uniform Act expressly rejected
this interpretation of the meaning "pro rata share," writing, "in
determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire
liability . . . their relative degrees of fault shall not be
69
considered."
Rhode Island judges continued to apply the "equal division"
approach indiscriminately until the early 1970s, when the Rhode
Island General Assembly enacted the state Comparative
Negligence Statute.70 Chiefly, the statute abolished the common
law rule of contributory negligence, which precluded a plaintiff
from recovering any damages if the plaintiffs own conduct
contributed to his injury. 7 1 Instead, a plaintiffs damage award
would be "diminished by the finder of fact in proportion to the
'72
amount of negligence attributable to the person injured.
Consequently, the law required Rhode Island juries to assign
percentages representative of each party's degree of fault, the
total sum of liability equaling 100%.73 As the courts embarked on
this endeavor, however, joint tortfeasor defendants turned against
the "equal division" of damages standard. 74 Preferring instead a
68. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 10-6-4 (1956) (stating that "[a] joint tortfeasor is
not entitled to a final money judgment for contribution until he or she has by
payment discharged the common liability or has paid more than his pro rata
share of the final money judgment") (emphasis added).
69.

UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, § 2, (amended 1955),

12 U.L.A. 265 (1939).
70.

See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (1972).

71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Leite v. Cartier, No. C.A. 72-1019, 1976 WL 176913, at *2

See id.
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"comparative share" contribution regime, each joint tortfeasor was
required to pay only up to his proportion of damages. 75 As one
judge noted, if a jury determined that the first joint tortfeasor was
99% at fault, and the second a mere 1% at fault,
it would appear to be absurd to permit the fact that each
[defendant] is a joint tortfeasor to rearrange the jury's
verdict and call upon the 1% negligent defendant to pay
50% of the judgment. Likewise, absurdity follow[ed] by
permitting the 99% negligent defendant to be rewarded
by virtue of his joint tortfeasor status and have his
payment reduced from 99% to 50% of the judgment. 76
In contrast, at least one other judge commented that the Rhode
Island General Assembly's decision not to adopt the 1955 Uniform
Act manifested the legislature's intent that joint tortfeasors
should be responsible for paying damages only in proportion to
their relative degrees of fault. 77
Judges who continued to apply the traditional "equal division"
computation reasoned that the General Assembly's enactment of
the Comparative Negligence Statute simply indicated an intent to
"ameliorate the harsh results that flow from the contributory
negligence rule," and was not intended to modify the existing
contribution statute. 78 Continued adherence to the equal division
contribution standard suggested a strict reading of both RIUCATA
and the Comparative Negligence statute.
These judges
determined that the latter was not intended to "permit
apportionment of pro rata shares of liability of the joint tortfeasors
as among themselves, '79 but rather was to be considered only
when the plaintiffs negligence was at issue.
Finally, in 1977 the General Assembly responded to the
inconsistent interpretations advanced by the comparative fault
statute by amending Section Three of RIUCATA. Section Three
reads: "when there is a disproportion of fault among joint
tortfeasors, the relative degree of fault of the joint tortfeasors
(R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 15, 1976); Hindy v. Bousquet, 1975 WL 169940, at *1

(R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 1975).

75. See Leite, 1976 WL 176913, at *2; Hindy, 1975 WL 169940, at *1.
76. Hindy, 1975 WL 169940, at *3.
77. Leite, 1976 WL 176913, at *2.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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shall be considered in determining their pro rata shares. '8 0
Hence, under the present statutory scheme as applied in the vast
majority of joint tortfeasor claims, "pro rata share" really means
"proportionate share." Yet, as discussed in Part II, this approach
has created more than its share of headaches for both judges and
litigants alike.
II.

COMPETING CONSIDERATIONS

The primary purpose of RIUCATA is to create a right of
In Rhode Island,
contribution among joint tortfeasors. 8 l
contribution is a statutory remedy that the common law did not
afford, and its aim is to promote fairness and justice among
wrongdoers. 82 On the other hand, an established public policy in
Rhode Island is to promote the private settlement of legal
disputes.8 3 Inevitably, on several occasions this dichotomy has
challenged the Rhode Island Supreme Court to fashion holdings
consistent with the Act's purpose of ensuring equitable results for
wrongdoers, while abstaining from further discouraging litigants
from engaging in meaningful out-of-court settlement negotiations.
Unfortunately, Rhode Island's adherence to the pro rata
reduction rule frustrates the task of encouraging settlement
agreements in joint tortfeasor claims. Pursuant to Section Seven
of RIUCATA, a plaintiffs settlement with one joint tortfeasor does
not discharge the other joint tortfeasor defendants, absent
language within the release stating otherwise.8 4 Instead, the
plaintiffs claim against the non-settling tortfeasors is reduced by
the greater of the amount paid for the earlier settlement, or an
80. R.I. GEN. LAws § 10-6-3 (1976).
81. See Hackett v. Hyson, 48 A.2d 353, 355 (R.I. 1946) (observing that
RIUCATA "was designed to reverse two well-established rules of law,
namely, (1) that there was no contribution among joint tortfeasors, and (2)
that the discharge of one joint tortfeasor by satisfaction of a judgment or by
its equivalent, a release, discharged all the other joint tortfeasors").
82. 18 AM. JUR. 2D Contribution§ 6 (2004).
83. See Homar, Inc. v. North Farm Assoc., 445 A.2d 288, 290 (R.I. 1982)
(announcing that "[o]ur policy is always to encourage settlement. Voluntary
settlement of disputes has long been favored by the courts," (citations
omitted). The court further commented that "[wihere the parties, acting in
good faith, settle a controversy, the courts will enforce the compromise
without regard to what the result might, or would have been, had the parties
chosen to litigate rather than settle.").
84.

See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-6-7 (1956).
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8 5
amount reflecting the settling tortfeasor's degree of fault.
Consequently, when the settling joint tortfeasor's pro rata
proportion of fault exceeds the amount agreed to in the settlement
release, the plaintiff risks having his judgment greatly reduced.
To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical. Suppose
Pete is hurt by Pancho and Sophie, both of whom are joint
tortfeasors within the meaning of RIUCATA. Assume Pete settles
with Pancho before trial for $2000. The settlement does not
release Sophie of her liability to Pete. Assume further that Pete
later sues Sophie, but Pete and Sophie are unable to settle their
dispute before trial. After each party presents his case, the jury
values Pete's harm in the amount $10,000. The jury additionally
finds that Pancho was 80% at fault, and Sophie 20% at fault.
Because Pancho's pro rata share of the liability is greater than the
consideration he paid for the release ($2000), Pete's award is
reduced by 80%, or $8000. Sophie is now required to pay only her
proportion of the liability, or, $2000. Hence, Pete will receive only
$4000, a mere fraction of the judgment awarded. Because Pete's
award will be reduced by Pancho's proportion of fault, the
inescapable conclusion is that Pete is actually discouraged from
settling prior to trial, as his award risks being substantially
reduced by an amount impossible for him to accurately gauge.
In authoring the 1955 revision of the Uniform Act, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
responded to the apparent settlement disincentives advanced by
the 1939 version of the model act, and modified the partial
settlement provision to allow for a reduction of the plaintiffs jury
award equal to the amount paid by the settlement release. 86 The
amendment's effect is that a plaintiff will receive the full value of
the judgment entered in her favor, while immunizing the settling
tortfeasors from defending later contribution actions instigated by
the non-settling defendant.8 7
As applied in Rhode Island tort cases, the settlement
disincentives propounded by the 1939 version of the Uniform Act the model act which RIUCATA is based on - are exemplified by
the 1979 case Augustine v. Langlais. In Augustine, the Rhode

85. See id.
86. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, § 4 (amended 1955),
12 U.L.A. 265 (1939).

87.

See id.
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Island Supreme Court confronted a scenario where the plaintiff
settled with one joint tortfeasor prior to trial for $42,000.88 At the
trial against the second tortfeasor, the jury found that the settling
tortfeasor was 85% negligent, and that the non-settling tortfeasor
was 15% negligent, rendering a damage award to the plaintiff for
$33,513.89 The court concluded that the superior court properly
reduced the jury award by $42,000, even though this meant that
the non-settling defendant - who the jury found 15% at fault was excused from paying anything to either the plaintiff or the
earlier settling defendant. 90 Despite this odd result, the court
justified its position on the grounds that the "injured person is
entitled to only one satisfaction of the tort, even though two or
more parties contributed to the loss." 9 1
Notably, the court did not re-state the concerns voiced by the
superior court judge who, in reducing the jury award as mandated
by the statute, recognized that RIUCATA
actually serve[d] to discourage the settlement of litigation
involving joint tortfeasors . . . once [the] one joint
tortfeasor bought his peace by settling, the other joint
tortfeasor had very little to lose by proceeding to trial, at
the great expense of the State, because they knew by
experience that a verdict in excess of $42,000 is
92
somewhat of a rarity in this State.
The trial judge further commented that "[h]ad the nonsettling defendants been faced with having to actually pay the
plaintiffs for the proportion of their jury determined negligence,
the possibility of settlement, by reasonable counsel, would have
93
been reasonably expected."
The supreme court's position in Augustine conforms to the
statute's purpose of promoting fairness for defendants by
This perspective,
proscribing "double recovery" by plaintiffs.
however, is advanced at the expense of supporting voluntary

88. Augustine v. Langlais, 402 A.2d 1187, 1188 (R.I. 1979).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1189.
92. Augustine v. Langlais, 1978 WL 207856, at *1 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb.
27, 1978).
93. Id.
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settlements among litigants, a policy that the supreme court has
enthusiastically embraced. And while the Augustine court was
undoubtedly constrained by the General Assembly's legislative
mandate, later cases would afford the court greater flexibility in
addressing the problems raised by RIUCATA's partial settlement
provisions.
In Maragdonna v. Otis Elevator Co., the court addressed the
effect of a prejudgment interest on a joint tortfeasor verdict where
the plaintiff settled with one joint tortfeasor prior to trial. 94 In
Rhode Island, prejudgment interest on civil actions is recoverable
pursuant to statute, 9 5 "at the rate of twelve percent (12%) simple
interest annually from the date the cause of action accrued, to be
included in the entry of judgment. '96
While visiting Rhode Island Hospital in September 1980, the
plaintiff injured herself as she stepped off an elevator, which
failed to stop at floor level. 97 The plaintiff sued both the hospital
and elevator manufacturer. 98 In February 1986, just five days
prior to trial, the hospital settled with the plaintiff for $7,500, and
the parties executed a joint tortfeasor release discharging the
hospital from further liability.99 Following the trial against the
elevator manufacturer, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff
in the sum of $20,000, reduced by 15%, which represented the
plaintiffs contributory negligence.100
The precise issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred
in first calculating the statutory prejudgment interest on the full
$17,000, and then discounting the $7,500 settlement amount. 10 1
The court rejected this method, preferring instead the non-settling
defendant's reduction method: subtracting first the $7,500
settlement figure from the jury verdict before computing the
prejudgment interest, (which, in this case, was substantial given
the five and a half year delay between the injury and trial). 10 2
94.
95.

542 A.2d 232 (R.I. 1988).

96.

DAVID J. OLIVERIA & JAMES

See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-21-10 (1997).
A.

RUGGIERI, DAMAGES IN RHODE ISLAND

CIVIL TRIAL PRACTICE 43 (2002).

97. See Margadonna,542 A.2d at 232.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 235.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 236.
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Despite RIUCATA's silence on the issue of prejudgment interest,
the court reasoned that this calculation was preferable because it
protected the nonsettling tortfeasor from paying "interest on the
103
amount of the settlement."'
In the context of civil actions involving joint tortfeasors, the
position established by the Augustine and Margadonna courts is
that the equitable rights of wrongdoers trump the equitable rights
04
of those who suffer injury at the hands of wrongdoers.
Although these opinions are technically consistent with
RIUCATA's purpose of promoting fairness and justice among joint
tortfeasors, they do so at the expense of plaintiffs. Not only does
this attitude discourage parties from engaging in private
settlement negotiations, but it also conflicts with a long recognized
goal of civil litigation - making the plaintiff whole. 105 Moreover,
the court's application of the prejudgment interest statute in
Margadonna stretched RIUCATA's purpose of ensuring fairness
for defendants much farther than the Act envisions. By insulating
the non-settling defendant from paying the excess of prejudgment
interest on the jury award, the court effectively transferred these
costs to the plaintiff. Lastly, the Margadonna method conflicts
with two of the underlying objectives of the prejudgment interest
statute: to serve as an incentive to the early settlement of
disputed claims and to "compensat[e] plaintiffs for waiting for
106
recompense to which they were legally entitled."'
The supreme court later acknowledged Margadonna as
unduly obstructive to the private settlement process. 107 In Merrill
v. Trenn,l0 8 the litigants asked the court to determine the
prejudgment interest on a jury verdict against a non-settling joint
tortfeasor when the plaintiff previously settled with a co-joint
tortfeasor, yet did not release the non-settling tortfeasor from

103. Id.
104. Id. at 235. The court specifically emphasized that Rhode Island's
contribution statute is designed to prevent a plaintiff from receiving a double
recovery for the same injuries, and that a nonsettling tortfeasor should not be
forced to pay interest on the amount of the earlier settlement. Id.
105. See generally Jay N. Abramowitch, Joint Tort/easor Releases - Time
for a New Approach, 72 PA. B.A. Q. 66, 69 (2001).
106. Martin v. Lubermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 559 A.2d 1028, 1031 (R.I. 1989).
107. See Merrill v. Trenn, 706 A.2d 1305, 1312 (R.I. 1998).
108. Id.
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liability. 109 In a thoughtful analysis examining the policies
underlying both RIUCATA and the prejudgment interest statute,
the court concluded that the Margadonna interest-computation
method "impede[d] the [settlement] process by preventing an
injured party who has given a joint tortfeasor release to an earliersettling defendant from ever recovering any prejudgment interest
on the early-settlement funds."1 10
Turning specifically to the policies underlying the
prejudgment interest statute, the court further commented that
although "the Margadonna rule .

.

. stems from § 10-6-7's claim

reduction provision - [it] could prove to be a disincentive to early
settlements while providing an undeserved windfall in savings to

any nonsettling alleged tortfeasors."1' 1 ' Notably, the court stated
that the Margadonnarule
[i]ncreased litigation costs and the vagaries of trial
outcomes can operate as a disadvantage to defendants as
well as to plaintiffs. In the face of the costly discovery and
all the potential expenses, delays, and uncertainties of
trial, including the risk of an unexpectedly large verdict,
(plus substantial interest accruing thereon), many an
alleged joint tortfeasor will be amenable to a pretrial
settlement for the entire amount of his or her potential
damages liability plus interest thereon. Thus the policies
behind the prejudgment interest statute (and the
[RI]UCATA) call for a method of interest computation in
cases like this one that will not impose disincentives on
willing litigants to reach as early and as accurate a
12
settlement as the parties can fashion."
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 1309.
Id. at 1312.
Id.

112. Id. The court then articulated an entirely novel, three-step formula
for computing prejudgment interest when there is an early settlement with a
joint tortfeasor yet no settlement release is executed. In such a case,.first,
the
non-settling or later-settling defendant shall be charged with
interest at the statutory rate...on the entire amount of damages
from the date on which the plaintiffs cause of action arose to the
date of any prejudgment settlement payment by an earlier settling
[defendant]." Second, once payment by the settling defendant has
been made, "the plaintiffs total damages shall be reduced by the full
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Although the court was primarily concerned with the manner
by which prejudgment interest affects the settlement landscape in
civil actions involving joint tortfeasors, the result in Merrill is
significant as it represents a seachange in the way Rhode Island's
high court approaches the problem of partial settlement releases.
Undeniably, the supreme court was concerned with devising a
prejudgment interest formula consistent with the preserving the
early-settlement rationale underlying the prejudgment interest
statute, while further ensuring that all of the parties - and not
merely non-settling joint tortfeasors - are treated fairly. Most
significantly, by importing the policy arguments of the
prejudgment interest statute into the context of partial settlement
releases, the Merrill court added substantially to the policy
arguments favoring pretrial settlements in tort claims involving
RIUCATA.
Lastly, the force of RIUCATA's historical purpose of
delivering
fairness
for
wrongdoers
remains
somewhat
compromised in light of the court's majority holding in the 2001
case Calise v. Hidden Valley Condo. Association.11 3 In Calise, not
only did the Rhode Island Supreme Court supplement the prosettlement policy arguments articulated in Merrill, but it also
clarified RIUCATA's relationship to the state's comparative
negligence statute.
Writing for the majority, Justice Bourcier held that a joint
tortfeasor who incurs a default judgment is precluded from
offering evidence of the settling defendant's alleged negligence at
a hearing to determine the plaintiffs damages recoverable against
the defaulting joint tortfeasor. 14 The ruling effectively precludes a
defaulting joint tortfeasor from seeking contribution from earliersettling defendants. Thus, regardless of any settlement proceeds
received by the plaintiff from the earlier settling defendant, for
purposes of the damage hearing the non-settling defendant is
amount of the earlier payment and the nonsettling defendant
charged with interest on the reduced balance of the remaining
damages for the period from the date of entry of judgment on any
settlement, verdict or decision.
Finally, "[t]he interest charged for both periods shall be added together and
the sum added to the amount of the remaining alleged tortfeasors' postreduction damages liability." Id. at 1313.
113. 773 A.2d 834 (R.I. 2001).
114. Id. at 840.
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deemed one-hundred percent at fault. 1 15
The subsequent
judgment, will, however, be offset by the amount paid in the
earlier negotiated settlement.
In denying the defaulting joint tortfeasors the opportunity to
present evidence tending to show the degree of the settling
defendant's negligence, the court announced that the state's
comparative negligence statute was not a comparative fault
statute. Rather, it "permits comparison of either the negligence
between a plaintiff and a defendant, or, in the case of multiple
defendants, the comparison of any negligence on the part of each
particular defendant. It does not contemplate or address the
proportionate negligence between the various defendants." 1 6 As
the court observed, if the defaulting joint tortfeasors were allowed
to present evidence of the settling defendants negligence at the
damages hearing, the settling defendants "would not want to
settle if they thought it possible that they could be forced later to
defend themselves, against defaulting defendants on the merits of
the lawsuit."117 Likewise, "the plaintiff would not be made whole
because the defaulting party would pay only his or her
proportionate amount of damages and, in view of the codefendant's full release, the plaintiff could not collect the
8
difference from the settling co-defendant."1
In reaching its conclusion, the majority avoided the pro rata
reduction rule prescribed by RIUCATA, applying instead a dollarfor-dollar award reduction against the defaulting defendant's
liability.
Consequently, in the context of defaulting joint
115. See id. at 838 (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-20-2 (1956), providing: "In all
cases, except where otherwise provided, if judgment is rendered on default ...
damages shall be assessed by the court, with the intervention of a jury unless
cause is shown why there should be no intervention of a jury. The claimant in
any case may waive the intervention to jury.").
116. Id. at 837-38.
117. Id. at 840.
118. Id.
Of course, as Justice Flanders correctly points out in his
dissenting opinion, the result hypothesized by the majority is still very likely
to occur in the normal multi-party tort claim where there is no defaulting
defendant. While Section 10-6-5 of RIUCATA, permits a settling joint
tortfeasor to collect contribution from all defendants who the settlement
releases from liability to the plaintiff, section 10-6-3 and 10-6-4 of the statute
also operate to ensure that "a joint tortfeasor held liable and compelled to pay
more than his, her, or its 'pro rata share of the final money judgment,' still
has a right to seek contribution from the other joint tortfeasors." Id. at 846
(citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-6-3 (1956); id. at §10-6-4).
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tortfeasors, the court preferred the pro tanto offset calculation
prescribed by the 1955 revision of the Uniform Act. Recognizing
that the comparative negligence statute itself contains no set-off
provision, the majority supported its reasoning on the basis that
the pro rata reduction rule should be considered only when the
plaintiff conduct contributes to his own injury. 119 Hence, when
the plaintiffs negligence is not at issue, the contribution and
comparative negligence statutes should, ideally, be viewed as
mutually exclusive.
Following Calise, even if one is to keep the two laws separate
in like scenarios, the rationale supporting the pro rata reduction
rule remains somewhat convoluted. If the General Assembly's
primary purpose in adopting RIUCATA was to ensure that a joint
tortfeasor who paid above and beyond his calculated share of
damages could recoup a portion of his expenses from his cotortfeasors, then the apportionment of fault to reflect each
defendants' degree of liability seems reasonable. But, given the
supreme court's treatment of the comparative fault statute in
Calise, apportioning liability for the purpose of creating a set-off
proportional to the settling joint tortfeasor's degree of fault seems
misplaced, especially when the plaintiff is not negligent. But this
is exactly the result mandated by the General Assembly's 1977
amendment to RIUCATA, which demands that "relative degrees of
fault" be consulted in determining each defendant's pro rata share
of liability. 120 Essentially, in designing a formula guaranteed to
proscribe the "double recovery" by a plaintiff after she enters into
a partial settlement release, the General Assembly effectuated the
same result contemplated by the comparative negligence statute,
even though the two laws are supposed to be mutually exclusive.
Accordingly, although Rhode Island's courts must continue to
apply the pro rata reduction rule in a manner consistent with
RIUCATA' s language, the court's recent treatment of the statute
- both in relation to the state's prejudgment interest and
comparative negligence laws - suggests that notions of fairness for
all parties, and not just wrongdoers, are likely to weigh in heavily
on decisions yet to come.

119. See, e.g., Calise, 773 A.2d at 838-39 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4.1
(1956)).
120. R.I. GEN. LAws § 10-6-3 (1977).
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III. THE BANKING CRISIS

The 2006 amendments to RIUCATA are modeled after
legislation enacted shortly after the infamous 1991 collapse of the
Rhode Island Share and Deposit Indemnity Corporation (RISDIC).
On New Year's Day, 1991, former Governor Bruce Sundlun
declared a "hank emergency," freezing 300,000 depositors accounts
within the state. 12 1 Blaming RISDIC's collapse on "incestuous
connections among politics, business, and organized crime," 122 the
General Assembly established the Depositor's Economic
Protection Corporation (DEPCO), a public corporation designed to
reimburse depositors who could not access their bank accounts
because of the bank emergency freeze. 12 3 Significantly, the
legislation developed "an entirely new financial institution
receivership law, as well as statutory priorities for prompt
payment to people whose deposits were left uninsured due to
124
RISDIC's failure."
DEPCO was also charged with "the pursuit of tortfeasors who
contributed to the banking crisis." 12 5 Anticipating a high number
of potential defendants whose alleged misconduct led to RISDIC's
demise, DEPCO's authors devised a contribution provision
mirroring, in substance, the 1955 revision of the Uniform Act.
Unlike RIUCATA, the DEPCO Act's provision addressing courtapproved settlements provided, in pertinent part, that:
[A] person, corporation, or other entity who has resolved
its liability to [DEPCO] .

.

. or the received of any state-

chartered financial institution in a judicially approved
good faith settlement is not liable for contribution or
equitable indemnity regarding matters addressed in the
settlement. The settlement does not discharge any other
joint tortfeasors unless its terms provide, but it reduces
121. See Fox Butterfield, Rhode Island Tries to Cope During 'Bank
Emergency', ALBANY TIMES UNION (NY), Jan. 3, 1991, at C7.
122. Brian Mooney, Joan Vennochi & Kevin Cullen, R.I Officials, Cozy
with Bankers, Did Little to Prevent Crisis, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 1991, at
Mi.
123.

See R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-116-2 (1993).

124. See id.; see also Ernst & Young v. Depositors Econ. Prot. Co., 862 F.
Supp. 709, 711 (D.R.I. 1994).
125. In. re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, R.I. Depositors Econ. Prot.
Co. v. Brown, 659 A.2d 95, 99 (R.I. 1995).
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the potential liability of the joint tortfeasors by the
126
amount of the settlement.
Among those suspected of playing a part in RISDIC's downfall
was Ernest & Young LLP, a New York accounting firm
responsible for auditing RISDIC's financial health. 127 Prior to
DEPCO's passage, Ernest & Young and other defendants could at
least take comfort in the prospect that RIUCATA's pro rata
reduction rule provided a cushy result if, for example, it decided
not to settle with DEPCO. For example, if Ernest & Young played
their odds and proceeded to a trial, and the jury found that Ernest
& Young's proportion of liability was less than the amount paid by
the settling defendant, then the firm could conceivably go "scot
free," excused from paying a dime to either DEPCO or the earliersettling defendants. 128 Likewise, even if Ernest & Young ended
up footing DEPCO's entire damage award, it could still seek
contribution from both settling and non-settling defendants

alike. 129
Surprising Ernest & Young, however, was the fact that the
DEPCO Act abruptly replaced the pro rata reduction rule
mandated by RIUCATA with a pro tanto, or dollar-for-dollar
partial settlement calculation for offsetting subsequent judgments
rendered in favor of the plaintiff. 130 Under the partial settlement
scheme prescribed by the DEPCO legislation, a partial settlement
agreement would have the effect of reducing a subsequent
judgment by the actual amount contemplated in the release,
rather than the non-settling defendant's pro rata share of
liability. 13 1 Ernest & Young's statutory right to contribution had
132
also been eliminated by the DEPCO Act's passage.
The accounting firm quickly challenged the statute's
126. R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-116-40 (1993) (emphasis added).
127. See Paul Manuele, Big Suits: DEPCO v. Ernest & Young, Dec. 1997
AM. LAW 91.
128. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 10-6-7 (1956).
129. See id. at § 10-6-8.
130. See id. at § 42-116-40 (2006).

131.

Id.

132. Id.; see also Terri L. Pastori, Banking Crisis Justifies Discriminatory
Classification of Nonsettling Joint Tortfeasors, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 513,
514 (1997) ("[T]he Rhode Island General Assembly modified the initial
DEPCO Act, which prohibits a nonsettling defendant, who the trier of fact
later finds liable, from seeking contribution from a settling joint tortfeasor.").
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constitutionality in federal court, asserting that the law deprived
Ernest & Young of their fourteenth amendment rights to due
process and equal protection, and that the statute qualified as an
unconstitutional bill of attainder. 133 While the federal district
court judge concluded that Ernest & Young lacked standing with
respect to its fourteenth amendment challenges, it did observe
that the "DEPCO Act's apparent purpose is to encourage
settlement of claims brought by DEPCO. To do this, the DEPCO
Act prohibits indemnity or contribution suits against joint
tortfeasors who settle with DEPCO . . . [t]his is in distinction to

Rhode Island's contribution statute, which allows one joint
tortfeasor to sue another for their proportionate share of liability,
and not just the amount of the settlement."'134 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court later upheld the constitutionality of the statute in
its 1995 advisory opinion to former Governor Lincoln Almond.135
The significance of the DEPCO Act lies in the General
Assembly's realization that RIUCATA was poorly equipped at
facilitating settlements in complex litigation involving multiple
tortfeasors. Admittedly, while the DEPCO Act did not disturb
RIUCATA, the statute at least represented a willingness on the
part of Rhode Island's lawmakers to experiment - and perhaps
learn from - a different methodology altogether with respect to
the manner in which Rhode Island handles partial settlement
releases involving joint tortfeasors.
IV.THE

STATION FIRE CRISIS

A. Brewing the Perfect Storm
On February 20, 2003, the California-based metal troupe
Great White took the stage at The Station, a West Warwick
nightclub owned by brothers Jeffery and Michael Derderian. 136

133. See Ernst & Young v. Depositors Econ. Prot. Co., 862 F. Supp. 709,
712-13 (D.R.I. 1994).
134. Id. at 712 (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 10-6-8 (1956)).
135. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, R.I. Depositors Econ.
Prot. Co. v. Brown, 659 A.2d 95, 106 (R.I. 1995).
136. See Jack Perry, Fire InvestigatorsFace Many Questions, PROVIDENCE
J., Feb. 21, 2003; Karen Lee Ziner & Zachary R. Mider, Many Feared Dead,
Scores Injured as FireRips Through West Warwick Club, PROVIDENCE J., Feb.
20, 2003, at B1.
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Perhaps best known for their song "Once Bitten, Twice Shy,"
Great White attracted close to four hundred concertgoers that
evening, most of whom resided in Rhode Island, Massachusetts,
and Connecticut. 137 Taking the stage shortly after 11:00 pm,
Great White greeted the revelers with a pyrotechnic display
operated by the band's tour manager, Daniel Biechele. 138 The
pyrotechnic devices emitted sparks, which in turn ignited the
139
sound-proofing foam insulating the club's walls and ceiling.
Within seconds, a roaring fire mercilessly ripped its way through
the sixty-year-old wood frame structure, pushing the confused
crowd toward the building's main entrance.14 0 The fire's thick
black smoke rapidly filled the club, blinding and choking victims
as they attempted to escape the roaring inferno. 14 1 Within ninety
seconds, the temperature inside The Station reached an estimated
1,800 degrees. 142 One hundred people died, over two hundred
143
were injured, and a mere seventy-seven escaped unharmed.
In hindsight, all of the ingredients for a terrible occurrence
were firmly in place. The combustible wood frame building had no
sprinkler system, poorly marked exits, and was insulated with
polyurethane packing foam, a product which fire safety experts
have likened to "solid gasoline."' 4 4 In the three years preceding
the inferno, state fire officials failed to note the existence of the
highly flammable foam, and also allegedly failed to properly
145
enforce then-existing capacity and exit requirements.
Moreover, Great White did not secure the requisite fire permits

137. See Passa v. Derderian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 43, 60 (D.R.I. 2004); Rock
Band Performing at the Station Was Once a Grammy Nominee, PROVIDENCE
J., Feb. 21, 2003.
138. See In a Span of Minutes, the Station Fire Grew from Sparks to a
Raging Inferno, PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 1, 2003, at B8.
139. See id.
140. See id.

141.

See Ralph Ranalli, Report Says Rhode Island Club Victims Had Little

Chance, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 4, 2005, at Al.
142. Id.

143. Passa v. Derderian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 43, 46 (D.R.I. 2004).
144. See, e.g., Ranalli, supra, note 133; Peter B. Lord, The Station
Nightclub Disaster - Foam Used at the Station is Well-Known Killer,
PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 9, 2003, at 1.
145.

Tracy Breton, Station Civil Lawsuit Refiled, PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 16,

2006, at B1.
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14 6
prior to setting of the indoor firework display.

B. The Station Fire Bill - DEPCORedux
Given the fire's horrific toll on human life and health, the
Rhode Island legal community immediately braced itself for an
expected mass deluge of personal injury claims. Just days after
the fire, Rhode Island Superior Court presiding justice Joseph F.
Rodgers, Jr. appointed Superior Court Judge Alice B. Gibney to
oversee all civil lawsuits filed as a result of the fire, irrespective of
whether they were filed in Rhode Island's courts. 147 Rhode Island
lawmakers also briefly flirted with the idea of establishing a

compensation fund for the Station Fire families and victims
modeled after the federal September lth Victim Compensation
Fund, 148 yet lawmakers ultimately discarded this plan for failure
149
to secure political support from the Governor's office.
In April of 2003, the first federal lawsuit relating to the
150
Station Fire was filed in Rhode Island federal district court,
invoking the applicability of the newly-minted federal Multiparty,

Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002.151
The 2002 law
expanded the federal courts' original jurisdiction over lawsuits
arising from accidents causing death to more than seventy-five
people at a discrete location, provided certain diversity
requirements are satisfied. 152 Penning the first opinion to explore
146.
147.
148.

See Levitz et. al., supra note 2, at 1.
Id.
See David McPherson, Sept. 11 Compensation Fund Looked at as

Model for Fire Victims, PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 6, 2003, at 16.
149. See Liz Anderson, Governor Reluctant to Use Tax Dollars for Fire
Victims, PROVIDENCE J., May 5, 2003, at A9.
150. See Tracy Breton, Lawyer Files Suit in Federal Court, PROVIDENCE J.,
Apr. 23, 2003, at 1.

151.

See Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1369

(2002).
152. Id. See also Peter Adomeit, The Station Nightclub Fire and Federal
JurisdictionalReach: the Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction
Act of 2002, 25 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 243, 247 (2003) (In summarizing the Act,
Mr. Adomeit writes:

The Act changes the laws of federal jurisdiction, removal
jurisdiction, venue, service of process, and subpoenas ... Once there,
the federal court 'shall abstain jurisdiction' if the dispute is
primarily local, or the federal court could keep the cases for
determining liability. If there is a finding of liability, there is a right
to immediate appeal; if liability is upheld, the federal court then
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the limits of the federal law's jurisdictional reach, in March 2004
Senior District Court Judge Ronald R. Lagueux held that the
Rhode Island district court was not required to abstain in civil
claims arising out of the Station Fire because the majority of the
plaintiffs were not Rhode Island residents, and the primary
defendants were not all from one state. 153 Determining that the
federal law was designed to consolidate in a federal court
litigation arising from a catastrophic disaster, Judge Lagueux
wrote that "Congress' motivation in passing this legislation was to
promote judicial efficiency while avoiding multiple lawsuits
concerning the same subject matter strewn throughout the
country in various state and federal courts."'154 Since then, the
majority of the Station Fire civil actions have been consolidated in
the federal district court for the District of Rhode Island before
Judge Lagueux under a master complaint, the latest of which
55
names ninety-seven defendants and 266 plaintiffs.1
Because early investigations into the cause of the fire
revealed a host of potentially culpable parties, victims' attorneys
quickly realized that Rhode Island's contribution statute would
likely hinder settlement negotiations. Assuming that all the
Station Fire defendants are joint tortfeasors within the meaning
of RIUCATA, if the victims entered into a settlement with a
defendant for $1 million, and a jury then rendered a $50 million
verdict, finding that the settling party was 50% responsible for the
victim's injuries, the $50 million verdict would be reduced by half,
leaving the victims with just $25 million. 156 Moreover, a settling
defendant could not "buy his peace" through the settlement, for
there always remained the risk that he would later be liable for
contribution if it turned out that his degree of culpability exceeded
the amount he paid for the settlement. 157
Additionally, even if the victims secured a judgment against a
returns the cases 'to the State court from which it had been
removed," for determination of damages, but is given discretion to
retain the damage issues as well.
(citations omitted)).
153. Passa v. Derderian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 43, 60-63 (D.R.I. 2004).
154. Id. at 53-54.
155. Third Amended Master Complaint at 1-18, Gray v. Derderian, No. 04312-L (D.R.I. Feb. 15, 2006); Breton, supra, note 145, at 1.
156.

See R.I. GEN. LAws § 10-6-7 (1956) (amended 2006).

157.

See id. at § 10-6-8.
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defendant, an additional risk remained that the defendant would
be financially insolvent and thus unable to satisfy the judgment
award. This was particularly true with respect to Great White,
the Derderian brothers, and the town of West Warwick. Great
White carried insurance coverage worth a mere $1 million
dollars. 15 8 The Derderians, who carried a $1 million dollar peroccurrence insurance policy on the nightclub, filed for Chapter 7
bankruptcy protection in September 2005, shortly after being hit
with a $1.6 million dollar fine by the State of Rhode Island for
failing to carry workers' compensation insurance. 159 Although the
town of West Warwick - whose agents were charged with
adequately inspecting The Station for safety hazards and
violations - maintained a $4 million dollar policy, it was of the
"wasting asset" variety, meaning that attorneys fees and
associated litigation expenses would be deducted directly from its
coverage.160 Consequently, the insurance coverage of the club and
these other potentially culpable parties would likely fall woefully
short of fairly compensating the numerous victims and their
families.
Lawmakers, knowing well that no plaintiffs attorney in their
right mind would advise their client to agree to settlement under
these circumstances, responded to the mass litigation crisis
brewing within Rhode Island through enactment of the house bill
H. 7109, otherwise known as the "Station Fire Bill."'16 1 Inspired
by the DEPCO Act borne in the wake of the 1991 banking
emergency, the bill amended RIUCATA itself, incorporating the
1955 Uniform Act's partial settlement revisions, but only for tort
claims involving twenty-five or more deaths arising from a single
occurrence. 16 2 Pursuant to the 2006 amendments to RIUCATA, a
non-settling defendant involved in such a catastrophe may no
longer claim an offset against the rendered judgment representing
158.

See Edward Fitzpatrick, Great White Was Carrying $1 Million in

Insurance,PROVIDENCE J., Jul. 3, 2003, at 1.
159. See Edward Fitzpatrick & Lynn Arditi, Station owners file for
bankruptcy, PROVIDENCE J., Sept 24, 2005, at Al.
160. See Levitz et al., supra note 2, at 1. It is worth noting that West
Warwick's liability would likely be subject to the statutory cap of $100,000
per victim pursuant to R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-31-2 (1997).
161. H.R. 7109, 120th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2006).
162. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-6-7, 10-6-8 (Supp. 2006); see also Breton,
supranote 8, at B1.
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the settling defendant's proportionate share of fault. 163 Instead,
the non-settling defendant is simply entitled to a pro tanto, or
dollar-for-dollar credit representing a sum equal to any earlier
settlement awards received by the plaintiff from the non-settling
defendant's co-tortfeasors. 164 The plaintiffs also receive the full
value of the judgment entered in his favor. Additionally, the
plaintiff may only claim the benefit of the revised act if the earlier
165
settlements were entered into with good faith.
Predictably, the bill faced strong opposition from pro-business
special interest groups such as the Greater Providence Chamber

163. See id. The 2006 amendments to RIUCATA, modified section 10-6-7,
which now reads:
A release by the injured person of the one joint tortfeasor, whether
before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tortfeasors
unless the release so provides; but reduces the claim against the
other tortfeasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the
release, or in any amount or proportion by which the release
provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the
consideration paid.
However, in circumstances where there are twenty-five (25) or more
deaths from a single occurrence, then a release by the injured person
of one -joint-tortfeasor given as part of a judicially approved goodfaith settlement, whether before or after judgment, does not
discharge the other tortfeasors unless the release so provides but
reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors in the amount of the
consideration paid for the release.
(emphasis added).
Similarly, Section 10-6-8, as amended, provides:
A release by the injured person of one joint tortfeasor does not
relieve him or her of liability to make contribution to another joint
tortfeasor unless the release is given before the right of the other
tortfeasor to secure a money judgment for contribution has accrued,
and provides for a reduction, to the extent of the pro rata share of
the released tortfeasor, of the injured person's damages recoverable
against all the other tortfeasors, [h]owever, in circumstances where
there are twenty-five (25) or more deaths from a single occurrence, a
release by the injured person of one joint tortfeasor given as part of a
judicially approved good faith settlement does not relieve him or her
from liability to make contribution to another joint tortfeasor unless
the release is given before the right of the other tortfeasor to secure a
money judgment for contribution has accrued, and provides for a
reduction to the extent of the amount of considerationpaid for the
release.
(emphasis added).
164. See id.
165. See id.
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of Commerce and the American Tort Reform Association. 66 Even
Rhode Island Governor Donald Carcieri permitted the Station Fire
Bill to become a law without his signature. 16 7 Moreover, among
the Station Fire Bill's sharpest critics were the "deep pocket"
defendants involved in the Station Fire civil litigation, such as
Anheuser Bush and Clear Channel Broadcasting - large, wealthy
corporations who sponsored Great White's show. 168 Because
Rhode Island's pure joint and several liability regime would allow
the victims to collect 100% of their award from any defendant who
is found at least one percent at fault, these Fortune 500 companies
could end up paying the entire judgment, even if they are
69
determined to be only minimally at fault.1
Despite this criticism, the Station Fire Bill represents a
comprehensive effort intended to encourage the parties involved in
the Station Fire tragedy to settle their claims prior to trial.
Although the large, "deep pocket" defendants may have to pay
more than their calculated share of fault, the favorable interests
embraced by the new law outweigh this drawback. Once any of
the Station Fire defendants settles, he becomes immune from
later being forced to defend a contribution action initiated by a
non-settling defendant. Given the "good faith" requirement of the
modified statute, the settling parties will also be keenly aware of
the non-settling defendants' interest in ensuring that the settling
defendants do not get off "too cheaply"; the good faith provision
presumably allows the non-settling defendants the right to contest
the amount of the settlement before the court. 170 Furthermore, in
166. See Breton, supra note 8, at B1; see also Press Release, American
Tort Reform Association, Legislative Watch, (May 4, 2006) (on file with
author) (ATRA asserts that the 2006 amendments to RIUCATA render the
state's joint and several liability law "one of the most unfair in the country.").
167. See Breton, supranote 8, at B1.
168. See Tracy Breton, Massive Lawsuit Filed on Station Fire Victim's
Behalf, PROVIDENCE J., Jul. 3, 2003.
169. See R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 10-6-7, 10-6-8 (Supp. 2006); see also Breton,
supra note 8, at B1.
170. See generally Richard C. Sipan, The House that Tech-Built has no
Foundation in Nevada: A Comparison of Good Faith Settlement Law in

California and Nevada, 57 INTER ALIA 1 (Jan. 1992) (explaining how
Nevada's good faith, pro tanto contribution statute, NRS 17.245, represents a
trade off of interests between settling and non-settling defendants).
The settling defendant wants the certainty that when he pays a sum
of money, he buys his peace once and for all and won't be required to
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exchange for foregoing any future contribution actions, the nonsettling defendants, if they choose to proceed to trial, will receive
the benefit of an offset representing any settlement proceeds
received by the victims. Most importantly, the Station Fire victims
will be made as close to financially whole as justice dictates. And
of course, the new law will likely help reduce the expenses borne
by the courts and litigants by encouraging the full and final
settlement of these complex and emotionally-charged claims.
Apart from the 2006 amendments' direct effect on the Station
Fire civil actions, the recent legislation also embraces the current
reality of Rhode Island's civil litigation landscape. Admittedly, in
1940, when the General Assembly adopted the initial version of
RIUCATA, Rhode Island was a simpler place. Following World
War II, however, American tort law expanded to encompass
doctrines such as strict products liability and medical malpractice;
areas of the law that have seen an increase in multi-party
claims. 171 Nationally, modern tort claims are more likely to
"involve novel legal and factual claims, higher stakes, multiple
parties, and greater technical complexity." 172 Moreover, in recent
history, America's courts have accommodated litigation instigated
73
by several mass disasters, including the MGM-Grand Hotel fire,,
come up with more money; to satisfy this interest, the state provides
that a good faith settlement bars all contribution claims against the
settling Defendant. The non-settling Defendants have an interest in
seeing that the settling Defendant does not get off too cheaply,
because they, the non-settlors, will have to pay the difference if
plaintiff wins a verdict or judgment at trial. The non-settling
Defendants get, in exchange for the cutting off of their contribution
claims, an offset in the amount of the settlement funds which is
deducted from the judgment amount, if any, awarded to plaintiff
after trial ... in addition, the non-settling defendants get the right to

contest the adequacy of the amount of the settlement and the
fairness of the settlement terms, in a good faith settlement
determination before the court.
Id.
171.

See THOMAS A. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT

LAW, 46-47 (New York University Press 2001).

See also Stephen McG.

Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System,

44

HASTINGS L.J. 1, 26 (1992).
172. McG. Bundy, supra note 171, at 1, 26.
173. See Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass
Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961,

974-76. The article's authors describe the event as follows: "On the morning
of November 21, 1980, faulty wiring in the kitchen of the MGM-Grand Hotel
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the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11,
2001, and most recently the 2003 stampede at a Chicago nightclub
which killed twenty-one people and injured more than fifty
others. 174 Unfortunately, time will only tell when the next
disaster resulting in loss of life and limb will strike.
As the DEPCO banking crisis illustrated, and the Station
Nightclub disaster reaffirms, RIUCATA is ill-equipped to
encourage pretrial settlements in tort claims involving multiple
defendants. Additionally, both events demonstrate that efforts to
foster just and speedy resolutions to complex, and oftentimes
emotionally-charged disputes is good public policy for Rhode
Island. First, from an institutional perspective, by extending that
applicability of the pro-tanto offset rule encapsulated in the
DEPCO Act and Station Fire Bill to all joint tortfeasor claims,
(and thereby eliminating the settlement barriers present in the
general applicability of RIUCATA), Rhode Island's courts are
likely to benefit from the preservation of scarce judicial resources
and reductions in docket backlog. 175 Second, from the point of
view of individuals involved in multiparty litigation, a partial
settlement contribution rule which encourages litigants to settle
prior to trial may result in more satisfying results if settlement is
achieved. 176 Lastly, settlement may provide a more favorable
result than full adjudication of a legal dispute
because in negotiation the parties are free to consider the
entire spectrum of relevant facts and principles, whether
or not they are formally cognizable in law ... the parties
have the flexibility to craft more creative - and

potentially more responsive - solutions to their problems,

in Las Vegas started one of the worst hotel fires in history." Id. "Eighty-four
people died, the majority of them from smoke inhalation, and over 500 people
were injured." Id. Notably, in the civil actions that followed, "the settlement
by the principle defendants placed great pressure on the remaining
defendants. They faced substantial joint and several liability, but would
receive credits from the principle defendants that were also limited to the
amount of their settlements." Id. This instance perhaps demonstrates how
the Station Fire claims are likely to be resolved.
174. Michael Higgins, PartialSettlement OKd in E2 Nightclub Stampede InsurancePolicies to Pay $1.5 Million, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 27, 2006, at 6.
175. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the
Supreme Court, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 36 (1996).
176. See id. at 37.
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because they are neither limited to the traditional legal
177
remedies nor 'binary', win/lose results.
V. CONCLUSION

As both DEPCO and the Station Fire Bill illustrate,
RIUCATA is an outdated contribution scheme inconsistent with
the realities of modern tort litigation. Rhode Island's litigation
landscape is much more complex today than it was in 1940 when
RIUCATA was initially adopted. On the bright side, however, is
the notion that both laws, coupled with the Rhode Island Supreme
Court's increased willingness to advance public policy goals
friendly to the facilitation of pretrial settlements, are indicative of
a warming towards the outright adoption of the pro tanto offset
rule adopted in the 1955 revision of the Uniform Act - a move
which will likely benefit not only Rhode Island's courts, but its
people as well.
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